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1 Introduction
I use it [systems thinking] often. But I can see why
people surrounding me don’t use it often. They think
it’s abstract. It’s not solving problems the way they
would like…
Gets a bit atomistic with people proselytising their
favourite words and models and flogging old horses
with new names, losing its pluralistic origins…
The statements come from some free text
responses on a small (though global) online
survey (86 respondents) amongst professionals
with knowledge of systems thinking in different
domains (Lachica 2013). Despite a clear need for
countering prevailing reductionist approaches to
impact evaluation, the comments flag issues
regarding the take-up of systems ideas in
evaluation practice. One issue is a reluctance to
emphasise the systems idea as indeed an abstract
idea – as though abstracting from reality is
somehow neither normal nor helpful. A second
issue is that systems thinking is often regarded
as something quite separate from, rather than
potentially integral to, other practices. Both
issues can lend themselves towards maintaining
a model of business-as-usual in evaluation
thinking in practice.
Formulating evaluative questions of impact from
real-world complexities requires a process of
abstraction. The problem of impact evaluation as
described through articles in this IDS Bulletin
might be summarised in terms of a broadening
of the questions to be addressed; from concerns
of impact in narrow terms of outputs to concerns
about wider outcomes being effected. A shift in
attention amongst evaluators is generally
acknowledged; from exploring questions
regarding the linear net effect of an intervention
(project, programme or policy) towards questions
regarding whether an intervention made a
difference to the situation, what the difference
was, how the difference was made, and what
differences might have been made elsewhere. It
represents a shift from being systematic towards
being more systemic. Such a shift in questioning
actually involves going up a level of abstraction
in order to deal with the complexities of
interventions.
Flood and Carson (1993) suggested that the
purpose of applied systems thinking is to deal
with situations of complexity. A cherished
hallmark of good systems thinking is the
aspiration to make simple the complex. Such an
aspiration may not sit comfortably amongst
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those who sometimes confuse systems with the
reality of a situation; or as the age-old systems
adage proclaims – those who confuse the map for
the territory (Korzybski 1995 [1933]). The
downside of an aspiration to simplify is a rebuke
that systems thinking can be too abstract. At one
level the rebuke is well founded. When a system
becomes too divorced from the realities that it
needs to address, its reliability can be
questioned. There is clearly something wrong
when, say, a health system assumes that sickness
can be fixed solely by increasing medication, or a
penal system is assumed to work purely on a
basis of punishing offenders, or an economic
system assumes profit motive to be the sole
driver of economic success. Likewise, when
systems of impact evaluation are simplified to
the extent of assuming a reality of linear
causality with independent parts – such as with
some extreme versions of randomised controlled
trials (RCTs) – then the impacts measured are
likely to be over-simplified and hence bear little
sense of resemblance to reality.
But let us be clear and unambiguous, systems
thinking is an explicit endeavour of abstracting
from reality. The challenge is to generate
abstracts that have not just reliability towards
mapping realities of the real world, but
resonance and relevance to the situations being
addressed. So rather than having systems of
impact evaluation based on, say, simple
abstractions of linear, mechanistic cause-and-
effect, it may be more appropriate to go up a
further level of abstraction – mirroring the shift
from systematic to systemic impact questioning
noted previously – for example, to consider
systems with parts interrelated in non-linear
ways, creating feedback loops, tipping points,
path dependencies, time delays, and so on, all
contributing to impacts that may not be so easily
predicted. The contributions to this issue of the
IDS Bulletin provide different means of using this
understanding of reality. Many draw on the
helpful idea of reality abstracted as a complex
adaptive system (CAS) (cf. Patton 2010; Forss,
Marra and Schwartz 2011; Ramalingam 2013).
A key feature shared by many authors in the use
of CAS is the assumption that not all situations
can be identified as complex, and therefore not
all situations demonstrate features of a complex
adaptive system. There has emerged a ritualised
practice in evaluation with supposing that
situations can be mapped from the outset into
being either simple, complicated, or complex –
an idea initiated by Ralph Stacey in terms of
organisational management (Stacey 1992) but
later adopted in the evaluation field
(cf. Glouberman and Zimmerman 2002). Such
thinking invokes a contingency approach
whereby the type of method adopted for an
evaluation is contingent upon the type of
situation. A popular metaphoric expression of
such situations is in distinguishing between three
different activities: (i) baking a cake; (ii) sending
a rocket to the moon; and (iii) bringing up
children. Whereas the former two activities
might respectively be regarded as being ‘simple’
(following recipe instructions) and ‘complicated’
(requiring address to many variables, but
nevertheless predictable in outcomes), it is only
the latter skill in parenting that invokes
‘complexity’ where the situation is volatile,
uncertain and highly unpredictable.
Chris Mowles (2014) provides an insightful
critique of contingency theory in relation to the
use of complexity ideas in evaluation. His core
argument draws explicitly on Stacey’s later
rejection of his own tripartite heuristic (Stacey
2001) by further suggesting that it might be
better to assume that all situations are complex.
Situations comprise humans and human
interaction is always complex and emergent. A
systems thinking perspective might go further
and suggest that all situations consist of
interrelationships that may be regarded at any
one time as being both (i) complicated –
interconnected – as evidenced in, for example,
chaos theory, and (ii) complex – involving people,
even if only as mere observers, and therefore
inviting multiple perspectives. Furthermore, a
critical systems thinking perspective might regard
all situations as (iii) conflictual – with differences
in relations of power circumscribing what is
deemed to be important with regard to boundaries
of interconnections (what’s in and what’s out)
and boundaries of perspectives (whose viewpoints
are more privileged and whose viewpoints are
more marginalised) (Reynolds 2011).
There are two points of departure here from
contingency theory. Firstly, as with Mowles, with
systems thinking in practice we would argue that
there are no actual ‘simple’ situations, given that
‘simplicity’ represents a particular perspective on a
situation rather than ‘the’ actual attribute of the
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situation. An artefact from a situation such as a
documented project, programme or policy may of
itself be regarded as ‘an’ attribute. As ‘an’ artefact
it may be regarded as simple or even complicated
(depending on the relative number of variables –
including different perspectives – being dealt
with). But the artefact in and of itself is not
complex. The complexity arises in the auditing,
planning, implementing and evaluating of the
intervention – that is, where and when different
perspectives are actually at play. Secondly, whilst
any situation might helpfully be regarded as
comprising all three interlocking features of
complicatedness (through interrelationships),
complexity (through multiple perspectives) and
conflict (through boundary judgements), there
remains a question on whether it is helpful to
delineate these situational features in order to
align particular evaluative methods – the
‘horses-for-courses’ thinking underpinning much
of contingency theory. Whilst there are now a
vast array of different evaluative methods,
including different systems and complexity tools,
it is perhaps helpful to remind ourselves that
such tools are conceptual devices rather than
reified objects; and hence open to change,
adaptation and innovation depending on the user
and context of use. Effectiveness may not
necessarily be contingent on ‘the method’ and
the ability to adopt new tools and associated
language, but rather the user’s experience and
craft skills in dealing with all three features of an
evaluand – complicatedness, complexity and
conflict – using whatever tools with which s/he
may have experience.
The distinction between situations and systems
is key to diagnosing potential problems of
contingency thinking and the helpfulness of
complexity thinking in impact evaluation, whilst
avoiding the pitfalls of seemingly being too
abstract and/or too atomistic. Situations might
be referred to as ‘messes’ as distinct from
‘systems of interest’ (Ackoff 1974), or as ‘wicked
problems’ – or even ‘super-wicked problems’ such
as with climate change (Levin et al. 2012) – as
distinct from ‘tame problems’ (Rittel and
Webber 1973). Systems thinking is therefore a
process of making simple the complex; a process
of abstracting from reality.
This article will take up a further level of
abstraction. Whereas a complex adaptive system
can provide a helpful abstract proxy to individual
interventions being evaluated, a similar systems
idea can be used as an abstract heuristic for
understanding the wider set of influences
associated with the political economy of evaluation
(see also Winckler Andersen in IDS Bulletin 45.6,
2014). The simplicity of the system captures
rather than detracts from the reality of the
evaluation process. The proposed device is based
on ideas of ‘systemic triangulation’; a generic
device that we might call a systemic triangulator.
After briefly introducing the idea of systemic
triangulation and considering its relationship
with the iron triangle metaphor, the political
economy of evaluation expressed in terms of an
evaluation–industrial complex will be explored.
By using systems thinking in practice some
questions are prompted regarding the influences
between an evaluand, evaluators and evaluations
with particular attention to contemporary
impact evaluation. The article finishes with some
thoughts on what a more benign system of
impact evaluation might look like.
2 From systems concepts to systemic triangulation
The three core concepts associated with systems
thinking – interrelationships, (multiple)
perspectives and boundary (judgements) – mark
a significant improvement in understanding and
engaging with essential features of systems
thinking. These are generally regarded as
standalone entities which may resonate with
entities of value and learning (Hummelbrunner
and Reynolds 2013; see also article by
Hummelbrunner in this IDS Bulletin). But these
entities might also be transformed into an active
endeavour – a heuristic of systems thinking in
practice – comprising verbs as well as nouns;
understanding interrelationships, engaging with
multiple perspectives and reflecting on boundary
judgements (Reynolds 2011, 2013; Williams, this
IDS Bulletin). In this article the heuristic is
adapted further to provide a template for
evaluating the political economy of evaluation
processes, something that was also suggested by
Winckler Andersen in IDS Bulletin 45.6 (Winckler
Andersen 2014). To do this I will draw on one of
the most profound generic expressions of systems
thinking – the notion of systemic triangulation
developed by Werner Ulrich (1998, 2000, 2003).
Systemic triangulation represents an extension
of ‘triangulation’ familiar in the empirical social
sciences. The extension is to rely not only on
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Figure 1 The systemic triangulator 
Boundary judgements of systems thinking in the partial
world of human activity
3 Systems for change
(Reflecting on boundary judgements)
2 Practitioners making
change
Value judgements in
‘multiverse’ world of multiple
stakeholders with multiple
perspectives
1 Situations of change
Factual judgements in the
‘universe’ of an interdependent
and interrelated world of
realpolitik
(Engaging with multiple
perspectives)
(Understanding
interrelationships)
different methods and theories for understanding
reality (interrelationships), but also for engaging
with alternative value sets (perspectives) and
reflecting on reference systems (boundaries) as a
source of assessing real-world practice (cf. Ulrich
2003: 334). Systemic triangulation refers to what
Ulrich calls an ‘eternal triangle’ of
interdependence between judgements of ‘fact’,
value judgements and boundary judgements
(Ulrich 1998, 2000):
Thinking through the triangle means to
consider each of its corners in the light of the
other two. For example, what new facts become
relevant if we expand the boundaries of the
reference system or modify our value
judgments? How do our valuations look if we
consider new facts that refer to a modified
reference system? In what way may our
reference system fail to do justice to the
perspective of different stakeholder groups?
Any claim that does not reflect on the
underpinning ‘triangle’ of boundary judgments,
judgments of facts, and value judgments, risks
claiming too much, by not disclosing its built-
in selectivity (Ulrich 2003: 334).
Figure 1 illustrates the influences between these
three entities. The systemic triangulator builds
on Ulrich’s original figurative triangle of facts,
values and boundary judgements (Ulrich 2000:
252). In my rendition of the triangle, ‘facts’
relate to the situations of change in the real
world associated with infinite interrelationships,
‘values’ relate to practitioners managing change,
associated with the core idea of multiple
perspectives, and ‘boundaries’ relate to the
ideas/tools/models used for decision-making
about managing change, associated with the core
idea of reflecting on boundary judgements.
Making boundary judgements is, as Ulrich points
out, a ‘partial’ activity in two senses of the word:
(i) partial in representing only a section rather
than the whole of the total universe of
interrelationships (what’s in and what’s out?); and
(ii) partial in serving some stakeholder
perspectives or interests – including practitioners’
interests – better than others (whose views are
privileged and whose are marginalised). The
inevitable partiality in systems thinking makes
clear the critical limits of being ‘holistic’ – getting
the big picture – (cf. Williams, this IDS Bulletin)
and of being ‘pluralistic’ – being inclusive of
stakeholders whilst claiming an unbiased view or
value judgement on different perspectives
(cf. Hummelbrunner, this IDS Bulletin).
The idea of systemic triangulation is itself
strongly influenced by traditions of critical social
Source Adapted from Reynolds (2013) and the original ‘eternal triangle’ of Ulrich (2000: 252).
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theory – particularly Jurgen Habermas – and
American pragmatism – particularly the works of
Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey,
Edward Singer and C. West Churchman (see
Ulrich 1983 for a detailed scholarly account of an
earlier synthesis of these ideas). The remainder
of this article explores the resonance that
systemic triangulation may have on the metaphor
of the iron triangle used in political science, and
how this metaphor might be helpful to explore
systemic failures generally, and systemic failure
in (impact) evaluation practice more specifically.
Table 1 Expressions of the iron triangle compared
The iron triangle: three (original) Paris Peace Military–industrial complex Evaluation–industrial
generic dimensions Treaty (1919) (1961) complex (2014)
i Interrelationships (on the ground) Bureaucracy Evaluand… including 
(contexts) professional soldiers managers/administrators 
(militarism) implementing interventions*
ii Multiple perspectives Interests of military industry Interest groups Evaluators… with the task of
(people) (materialism) representing (and inevitably) 
privileging different interests
iii Boundary judgements Decisions of politicians Decisions of Congress Evaluations… as expressions 
(ideas/tools) (bourbonism)** of advice to decision-makers 
(commissioners of
interventions)
*Interventions can include any intended action on the real world, ranging from simple plans or projects, to wider
programmes or policies, and from local to global levels. 
**Bourbonism depicts extreme political and social conservatism. It draws on subservience to support for the rule of
the Bourbons, a European royal line that ruled in France from 1589–1793 and 1815–48, and in Spain (1700–1808;
1813–1931) and Naples and Sicily (1734–1806; 1815–1860).1
Source Author’s own. 
Figure 2 Evaluation-in-practice represented as possibly an evaluation–industrial complex: an influence diagram
illustrating six activities – (a) auditing; (b) planning; (c) evaluating (understanding); (d) evaluating (practising);
(e) commissioning; and (f) learning
Decision-making… focusing on sponsors and
commissioners of evaluations
3 Evaluations
(Reflecting on boundary judgements)
2 Evaluators
(Engaging with multiple
perspectives and value
judgements)
Advisory support… focusing on
mediating different interests for
effective implementation
1 Evaluand
(Understanding
interrelationships and factual
judgements)
Implementation of decisions…
focusing on project/programme
managers and administrators
Source Author’s own.
a
b
c
d
f
e
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3 The iron triangle and an evaluation–industrial
complex
The iron triangle metaphor was first expressed
by Ralph Pulitzer, a political journalist reporting
critically on the Paris Peace Conference amongst
victorious allied governments following the First
World War in 1919. Pulitzer warned against the
insipid confluence of interests amongst three
exclusive sets of actors – the military, industry
and politicians making the decisions (Pulitzer
and Grasty 1919). The iron triangle is helpful in
speaking to a wider sense of systemic failure; one
popular expression being the ‘military–industrial
complex’ used by American President Dwight
Eisenhower during his 1961 presidential
resignation speech. Political activists like Angela
Davis and Arundhati Roy have adapted ideas of
‘industrial complex’ and ‘iron triangle’
respectively to surface pernicious confluences of
interest in more specific domains. Similarly,
radical economists like J.K. Galbraith amongst
other academics have used and developed these
ideas in studies of political economy. Elsewhere,
I have used the iron triangle metaphor to analyse
systemic failure amongst academic economists in
the midst of the global economic crisis of 2008
(Reynolds 2014).
The metaphor is generically used to describe
interaction between three entities: (i) some
loosely defined ‘bureaucratic’ entity which
represents the site of real-world implementation
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Table 2 Two contrasting views of evaluation-in-practice
Activities Evaluation–industrial complex Evaluation–adaptive complex
a Auditing – overview the site  Situations of an evaluand are Situations of an evaluand are 
of implementing an systematically recognised at outset as systemically viewed as comprising all of
intervention (project, either tame (simple or complicated (i) complicatedness (interrelationships), 
programme, policy, plan…) with linear cause-and-effect attributes), (ii) complexity (multiple perspectives), 
or wicked (complex with non-linear, and (iii) conflict (contrasting boundary 
unpredictable effects and impacts). judgements). Side-effects are inevitable.
b Planning – design of terms  Planning is purposive – based on a Planning is purposeful – based on ‘agile’ 
of reference (ToR) for the perceived need for rather fixed goals measures of success that are not rigidly 
intervention and targets. Where need be, with defined by fixed quantitative indices 
‘complex’ situations, a dominant alone, but also qualitative indices 
imperative is to ‘tame’ any ‘wicked-ness’ (stories, narratives, case studies, 
in the situations depending, for testimonies, etc.); both adaptable to 
example, on quantitative measures of changing situations in the evaluand and 
success. Little room for flexibility and hence being flexible, adaptive and 
adjusting measures over time. imaginative. 
c Evaluating 1: understanding Evaluator unquestionably adopts Evaluator able to question ToR of
measures of success passed on through evaluand, including its own measures 
ToR of the evaluand. Regards evaluand of success. Regards evaluand as a 
as a fixed operational system learning system adapting to changing 
(ontological mechanistic reality). Adopts circumstances. Adopts radical 
disinterested (quasi) positivist epistemology constructivist epistemology involving self-
involving as much as possible objective awareness of biases in shaping the 
valuation with prime attention to evaluation. Able to continually juggle 
avoiding bias. Focus more on efficiency between focus on efficacy, efficiency 
in relation to efficacy and effectiveness. and effectiveness (including ethical and 
political notions of equity and 
sustainability).
d Evaluating 2: practice Practitioner role as measuring of value, Practitioner regarded as an agile 
either as specialist user of same tools – ‘bricoleur’, a craftsperson formatively 
‘bestpracticitis’, or seeking an ever developing value (instrumental, intrinsic
growing ‘toolbox’ adopting new tools and critical) through adapting tools 
as ‘best fit’ for purpose (‘horses-for- with new ideas during the course of
courses’). an evaluation.                          /cont.
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of decisions (e.g. civil servants, managers and
administrators); (ii) interest groups/individuals
who stand to benefit from the implementation of
decisions (e.g. commercial and corporate
interests of various kinds, or commissioned
advisory groups whose task is to capture different
interests); and (iii) decision-makers themselves
responsible for making and justifying decisions
(e.g. Congress or Parliament, or at a lower level,
commissioners of interventions).
For the purpose of exploring the industry of
evaluation, the iron triangle metaphor might be
used to describe interaction between three
domains: (i) some site of real-world impact of an
intervention – project, programme or policy –
with managers and administrators responsible
for implementing the intervention;
(ii) evaluators as an interest group active in the
process of evaluating interventions – principally
and ideally capturing different values from
different perspectives; and (iii) decision-makers
– commissioners, foundations, donor agencies –
ultimately responsible for interventions with
implicit and/or explicit models of decision-
making to justify actions taken, including the
commissioning of evaluations. Table 1 maps out
the correspondence between different
expressions of the iron triangle.
Figure 2 is a broad representation of the triadic
relationships between these three domains for
what might be called ‘evaluation-in-practice’ and
which may have particular expression through
an evaluation–industrial complex.
The influence diagram might be used as a
diagnostic systemic tool for identifying flaws and
opportunities associated with evaluation –
whether impact evaluation or any other
formalised set of evaluation practices, and at any
level of intervention – whether evaluating a policy,
programme or project directly, or evaluating an
evaluation as an intervention in itself.
The notes below give some guidance on how the
arrows of influence may contribute towards
systemic failure of an evaluation–industrial
complex. Although the notes attempt to focus on
impact evaluation, they may be deemed relevant
to evaluation more generically, particularly
evaluation based on a contingency approach.
Readers may find reference to Table 2 helpful for
further understanding of activities (a) – (f).
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Table 2 Two contrasting views of evaluation-in-practice (cont.)
Activities Evaluation–industrial complex Evaluation–adaptive complex
e Commissioning ToR for Rigour narrowly defined in terms of Rigour understood as three sets of
evaluators of interventions objective reliable and replicable use of co-guarantor attributes: (i) transparency 
requiring some guarantee evaluation tools as fixed commodities; of limitations in different contexts, 
or assurance of proven through application in case rather than some claim towards 
trustworthiness studies understood as being suitable achieving ‘objective truth’; 
for either simple/complicated (tame) or (ii) complementarity or resonance – 
complex (wicked). Assurances relating to communicability with other disciplines/
resonance with existing practices tend groups/cultures, etc.; and (iii) social and 
not to be given importance. Rigour ecological responsibility or relevance – 
associated with demonstrating internal coherence in dealing with all
responsibility is limited to providing inevitable issues of complicatedness, 
assurances of accountability to decision- complexity and conflict, and external 
makers rather than serving wider social coherence in addressing issues of social 
and ecological imperatives. and ecological responsibility.
f Learning… gained by decision- Enables single-loop and sometimes Enables single-loop, double-loop and 
makers from evaluations double-loop learning, but generally triple-loop learning from an evaluation 
less reflective of power relations of an evaluand, including learning that 
circumscribing the primary intervention all evaluands have degrees of
and/or circumscribing the secondary complexity and conflict. Evaluation 
intervention in terms of evaluating the regarded as political, but also involving 
intervention. Evaluation regarded as humility in dealing with uncertainty.
apolitical.
Source Author’s own.
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a Auditing situations A proposed intervention
involves some initial auditing in making
(boundary) judgements associated with the
factual reality of the intervention situation
(the evaluand). A first audit based on
contingency thinking would determine
whether the situation (evaluand) is one where
the interrelationships might be bounded as
simple or complicated or more complex. Is the
situation akin to invoking a quick fix solution
– like recipe reading in baking a cake? Or is it
one requiring lots of logistical support – like
sending a rocket to the moon? Or is it very
unpredictable and uncertain – like parenting
a child? Many initial audits to guide
interventions are premised on a false pre-
supposition that the problem situation can be
delineated at the outset between being tame
or wicked… between being a mere difficulty
or a mess… between being merely
complicated or complex. The auditing ignores
the idea that people – with different
perspectives – make all social situations not
only complex but often conflictual.
The key task for decision-makers responsible
for initiating interventions2 is to make initial
boundary judgements that appear to be ‘true’
to the reality of the situation. The problem
though is in assuming that such boundary
judgements based on some ‘truth’ of the
situation are able to be made from the outset.
For example, a problem situation might be
defined in terms of the prevalence of measles
in children within a national population.
Eradicating measles amongst the under-fives
might be regarded as a relatively tame
problem – simple or possibly, complicated, but
not necessarily ‘complex’. However, important
caveats might be made in regarding this as a
‘tame’ rather than a ‘wicked’ problem. It may
only be regarded as tame if important ‘inputs’
or conditions are given – including for
example, availability of effective medications,
trained staff and management protocols, etc.
Clearly, the risk is in auditing ‘situations’ as
though they are ‘given’ systems – viewing
messy situations as though they are just
implicitly well-defined problems – confusing
the territory for the map. There is an error
here in factual judgement which regards the
real world as ‘simple’ or ‘complicated’ (i.e.
tame) without appreciating the human factor
that makes all social situations complex and
potentially conflictual (i.e. wicked). It is
human agents – people – that translate
‘wicked’ situations into ‘tame’ situations –
humans that translate messy situations into
systems. The eradication of measles amongst
under-fives is as complex as preventing the
spread of Ebola; it is a situation in which
wider factual judgements of context regarding
culture, history, geography and politics clearly
have a significant role in shifting the problem
from being ‘tame’ to being more ‘wicked’.
Might it be more useful then to assume
complexity from the outset, given that
complexity is determined not just by
complicatedness of there being many
interrelated variables, but by the human
factor of there being multiple perspectives on
the situation? Moreover, the incidence of
multiple perspectives prompts alertness to
there being actual and potential conflicts –
conflicts in contrasting boundary judgements.
A more useful principle might be to start any
audit more systemically, taking account of not
just interrelated variables in the situation, but
different perspectives and potential conflicts
amongst key stakeholders.
b Planning (terms of reference) interventions A typical
sequence of tasks in planning an intervention
involves firstly establishing an overall purpose,
then constructing or designing reasonable
objectives, and then defining some measures
of success by which the intervention might
then be evaluated. Defining the purpose
represents the prime boundary of the system
of intervention being initially designed. Two
questions arise. First, at what level of planning
are the purposes or objectives located – policy
design, programme/project management, or at
the level of operational administration?
Second, how much flexibility is there in the
system – do the purposes/objectives/measures
remain fixed or are they open to change? For
example, regarding the planning involved with
confronting an issue of disease prevention, is it
just a problem of ‘administering’ vaccinations
at an operational level of planning, or might it
be a set of objectives at a higher level of
planning, possibly involving new management
structures or even a change in national health
policy? However initially perceived, it is helpful
for evaluators of an intervention to regard
these objectives in a wider contextual field as
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nested purposes or objectives; that is,
circumscribed by a supra-level system of
purpose or worldview, and drivers of implied
sub-level systems of more tactical ‘targets’.
Regarding purposes in this way enables
evaluators to see the intervention as being
purposeful rather than purposive (see also
Hummelbrunner in this IDS Bulletin). A
purposive system is one where the purposes
remain rigid and unfluctuating, more
commonly associated with mechanically
designed systems like washing machines and
watches. Human systems are, or ought to be,
purposeful in the sense that purposes are fluid
and subject to change given inevitable change
in circumstances (Ackoff and Emery 1972). A
key problem shared amongst many evaluators
is that they see little room for manoeuvre in
advising against proffered objectives of an
intervention (see also Williams in this IDS
Bulletin).
‘Measures of success’ against which to monitor
and evaluate ‘impact’ of intervention objectives
are themselves boundary judgements. Ideally
such measures ought therefore not to be fixed.
A common critique of the most prevalent
planning tool in international development for
surfacing such measures – logical framework
analysis (LFA) – is the assumed inflexibility
and rigidity. The LFA approach tracks a
pathway from resources inputs to activities,
outputs, outcomes and impacts in a sequential
unilateral manner helpful at the operational/
administrative level of planning, where clear
measures in terms of performance indicators
can be identified. But it has less value for
complex situations. When applied to such
situations, the messy realities can become
dangerously entrenched as being simple and
subject to linear cause-and-effect explanations.
c Evaluating 1: Understanding (interrelationships) Two
aspects of evaluation might usefully be
conceptually demarcated – firstly, understanding
the context of the evaluand, and secondly,
engaging in practice with the various agencies
of the evaluand. In real-world praxis the two
are, of course, intricately interwoven; as with
corresponding dualities of theory/practice,
thinking/action, as well as the thinking in
practice of summative/formative evaluation.
Abstracting out understanding and practice
can help reveal the more direct interwoven
sources of influence on evaluators’ praxis.
Item (d) will explore further the influences on
evaluation practice – a more formative
endeavour of developing value – whilst item
(c) here will focus on how understandings of
value in the context are influenced (see
Williams, this IDS Bulletin).
Evaluators are essentially tasked with
translating factual judgements relating to the
real-world complicatedness, complexity and
conflict, into appropriate value judgements.
Measures of success – suggested by the
intervention’s terms of reference (ToR) – might
be translated in terms of efficacy and efficiency
(has the intervention worked according to its
mandate with good use of resources?) and
effectiveness (what wider effects may have
been generated by the intervention?). As
Hummelbrunner points out (this IDS Bulletin),
a third concern for evaluators might also be to
understand wider critical and political values of
equity and sustainability in relation to the
intervention. The task then is to capture these
realities of an intervention in terms of
appropriate values – instrumental, intrinsic
and critical/political. Practitioners in the
evaluation industry may like to consider the
extent to which their evaluations are biased
towards the instrumental values passed down
through the ToR.
Evaluation is often regarded normatively as
being a bias-free pursuit of ‘truth’. The task
traditionally is to capture the realities of
interrelationships in as an objective (and
hence ironically, value-free) way as possible
using scientific tools and procedures that can
reduce bias. The imperative of objectivity and
independence appears to remain very strong
in the evaluation community. For example,
Mowles speculates that in using the
contingency approach evaluators ‘continue to
cleave to what John Dewey [1929]… referred
to as a “spectator theory of knowledge”, which
assumes separation between the observer and
the thing being observed’ (Mowles 2014: 164).
Understanding the evaluators’ own value
judgements in the role of evaluating an
intervention requires making an epistemological
shift. It requires moving from a conventional
view regarding interventions as ontological
realities ‘out there’ subject to evaluation, to a
view of interventions as conceptual constructs
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(helpfully regarded as systems of interest) and
an evaluator as a co-creator of such constructs
as part of her/his engagement with the reality.3
In sum, ritualised (mis)understandings in
evaluation may involve not only: (i) the
piecemeal sectioning of perceived complex
situations from complicated or ‘simple’
situations at the outset (that is, failing to
recognise that all situations involving human
activity are complex); but (ii) a possible
marginalisation of addressing issues of conflict
and equity (again, failing to recognise this as
an aspect – to varying degrees – of all human
activity). In addition, the misunderstanding
may involve: (iii) confusing interventions (as
well as evaluations of interventions) as
ontological realities as against constructivist
endeavours; endeavours that speak more to
the practice of formative evaluation.
d Evaluating 2: Practice (engaging with multiple
perspectives) The formative side of evaluation is
related to the actual practice with using tools
in an evaluand context and thus impacting on,
and generating value with, the stakeholders
associated with the evaluand.
In Aid on the Edge of Chaos (Ramalingam 2013)
a typology of four sets of challenges is offered
to those working with complex situations –
systemic, behavioural, relational and dynamic.
Ramalingam then identifies and draws on
four designated families of ‘complex systems
approaches’ which can ‘fit’ the designated
challenges respectively; ‘systems approaches,
behavioural approaches, network methods and
dynamic analysis techniques’. This follows a
long tradition in the field of management
consultancy; working with typologies of
situations and then designating methodologies
in alignment with the situation-type
(cf. Ghoshal and Nohria 1993). In effect the
process involves not just ‘taming’ situations
(e.g. simple, complicated, complex), but
taming methods and tools to fit the context as
well. In the systems tradition, a similar
process gained considerable currency with
Total Systems Intervention (TSI) (Jackson and
Flood 1991) in allocating particular systems
approaches to particular situations. The
mapping was done using the Burrell and
Morgan (1979) typology of four social science
paradigms – objectivist ‘functionalism’ and
‘radical structuralism’, and subjectivist
‘interpretivism’ and ‘radical humanism’. So
system dynamics, for example, was assigned
to the paradigm of functionalism, whereas soft
systems methodology was assigned to the
paradigm of interpretivism.
The similarity with the four groups
typologised in Aid on the Edge of Chaos is
perhaps significant, albeit each of the four
approaches suggested by Ramalingam relate
to large families of methods, rather than any
single best practice. Whilst the latter idea is
nicely critiqued within international
development in terms of ‘an epidemic of
bestpracticitis’ (Ramalingam 2013), there
remains a pervasive notion of ‘best fit’ –
expressed also in the working title of a draft
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) paper
– ‘From Best Practice to Best Fit’
(Ramalingam, Laric and Primrose 2014).
The problem here remains one signalled by
critiques of TSI (cf. Ulrich 2003; Reynolds and
Holwell 2010; Reynolds 2011). Systems
approaches – or indeed any tools, methods,
approaches – do not have a pre-determined
fixed use-value, outside of the context of use
and the individual(s) doing the valuing or
acting as users. To assign such ‘objective’
value of tools decoupled from the valuer
involves reifying the tools; fetishising the
methods. To coin a term used by one popular
cynic of command and control approaches
used in the public sector, might there be
slippage within the evaluation industry
towards professionals becoming ‘toolheads’?
(Seddon 2003). Despite warnings in the draft
ODI paper of succumbing to a ‘toolkit
temptation’ which may lead to unhelpful
‘complexity silver bullets’, there remains a
risk in getting fixated on and commoditising
complex systems approaches in a ritualised
practice of promoting an ever bludgeoning
chest of evaluation tools.
There is something here that speaks to a
question from Duncan Green ‘… is the whole
point of complex systems that you can’t have
standard approaches, only connected, agile
people able to respond and improvise?’ (Green
2014). These ideas of agility and better practice
amongst evaluators is perhaps best captured by
a metaphor from the French anthropologist
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Levi-Stauss in the 1960s; the art of a bricoleur.
As Patton explains, this is a travelling
nineteenth-century rural craftsman in France
skilled in using and adapting tools at hand, but
with, as well, a sense of inventiveness and
creativity for purposeful intervention – the art
of bricolage (Patton 2010: 264–304).4
e Commissioning (terms of reference) evaluations
Sponsors not unreasonably require some
guarantee of rigour from evaluators being
commissioned. The terms of reference in
commissioning evaluations signal the need for
some degree of assurance and trustworthiness.
Evidence-based, results-orientated evaluations
typically signal guarantors of objectivity –
some sense of reliability based on replicability
and bias-free recommendations. The
popularity of, and investment in,
experimental approaches such as RCTs where
such assurances are paramount is testament
to the power of such guarantors in evaluation.
An underlying critique of RCTs from a
contingency approach perspective is that they
are inappropriately applied to complex
situations where the variables generating the
effects are often unknown and changeable,
and hence difficult to ‘control’. Hence any
results generated may not always be reliable.
So what guarantors if any might be offered in
complex situations? Glenda Eoyang, the
founding Executive Director of the Human
Systems Dynamics Institute and a long-time
practitioner in the use of complex adaptive
systems for evaluation, commented: ‘The only
thing you can be certain of is uncertainty, but
you can’t even be sure how much of that you
have…’. Glenda went on to comment: ‘On the
other hand, there’s no escape into constructivst
angst and unknowing because there is a world,
and we act, and it changes, so there is some
grounding for meaningful conceptual models
and options for action’ (pers. comm. 2014).
Ultimately, of course, there can be no absolute
guarantor of certainty with interventions in
situations that are inherently uncertain, but
there remains a need for commissioners of
evaluations to require some sense of
trustworthiness.
Practicing evaluators may like to reflect on a
need for two sets of co-guarantors in addition
to traditional scientific (disciplinary) based
criterion of ‘objectivity’, reliability and
replicability. Firstly, there are (more
interdisciplinary) co-guarantors of
‘complementarity’ – a communicative
competence in facilitating meaningful
conversation and exchanges between and
amongst stakeholders in the context of an
evaluation (process). The guarantor here is
one of generating ‘resonance’ with others.
These stakeholders might involve other
relevant sources of expertise from different
disciplines, but critically also including the lay
expertise of those directly involved in, and
affected by, the intervention being evaluated.
A trap in ritualised practice of supporting
resonance is in proposing fail-safe techniques
that have been ‘tried and tested’ in some
contexts and recommended for perceived
similar contexts. Unfortunately, the space to
experiment – a culture of safe-fail (Stravinsky
2000) – is perhaps an underrated guarantor
sparingly afforded to evaluators.
Secondly, there are (more transdisciplinary)
co-guarantors of what might be called ‘social
and ecological responsibility’ (Reynolds 2008)
– a reflective competence in ‘relevance’; not
only in addressing the internal coherence
(interrelationships, multiple perspectives and
boundary judgements) of the intervention in
dealing with complicatedness, complexity and
conflict, but also the external legitimacy of the
intervention as a whole, in terms of its wider
accountability to social and ecological well-
being (equity and sustainability).
‘False’ co-guarantors or assurances may
involve either incompetence or incapability in
the use of any one set, or the unreflective
privileging of one set of co-guarantors over
another (Reynolds 2001).
f Learning through evaluating For commissioners,
the immediate need from evaluations is to
learn whether and how any particular
intervention is working (measures of efficacy
and efficiency); learning not only on whether
the intervention is serving its purpose but
whether the purpose being served is the most
appropriate purpose (measure of effectiveness).
The learning provided here is in part single-
loop – learning to do the thing right – but also
double-loop – learning to do the right thing –
(see Hummelbrunner, this IDS Bulletin).
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Evaluators from a tradition using the
contingency approach are prone also to advise
commissioners in learning not to see all
situations as being tame but rather to view some
situations as complex or wicked and requiring
different approaches. Developmental evaluation
(Patton 2010) and Aid on the Edge of Chaos
(Ramalingam 2013), as well as contributors to
the Evaluating the Complex compilation (Forss et
al. 2011), are well endowed with many good
case studies illustrating the need for double-
loop learning in complex situations.
However, choosing case studies that from the
outset are clearly complex involving many
viewpoints and conflicts may lend a false sense
of security to commissioners that other
evaluands (sponsored interventions) are
actually ‘simple’ or at most merely
‘complicated’. Perhaps a more significant
learning point might come from drawing on
case studies that may superficially appear to
be merely simple or complicated but actually
reveal complexity and conflict in the course of
an evaluation. Commissioners might then
learn that all evaluands are actually complex
to varying degrees. This relates to a possible
missing third loop of learning regarding
power relations (see again Hummelbrunner,
this IDS Bulletin).
Triple-loop learning questions how ‘rightness’
is circumscribed by ‘mightiness’ and vice versa
(ibid.). Evaluators may like to consider how
the contingency approach has a powerful hold
on practice. Arguably, it is an example of
relatively unquestioned sense (of ‘rightness’)
amongst evaluators dominating (the
mightiness of) decision-making amongst
commissioners. The contingency approach
provides a powerful argument for having
multiple methods, each with ascribed fixed
functions and values. It prompts the ritualised
practice of having an ever increasing
‘armoury’ of methods. It prompts decision-
makers (commissioners of interventions, for
example) to support an existing toolkit either
with an ‘overhaul’ of new tools, or expanded
incrementally with a ‘broader menu of tools’.
4 Discussion: breaking the triangle and abstracting
a more purposeful system of evaluation
Whilst there is much to be commended in all
three publications using complexity ideas for
evaluating interventions (Patton 2010; Forss et al.
2011; and Ramalingam 2013), there remains
some doubt as to whether one unholy trinity –
one iron triangle – might inadvertently be
substituted by another. The first, being implicitly
critiqued by all three publications, involves a
dynamic depicting: (i) situations regarded as
comprising factors related only by linear
causality (a judgement of ‘fact’); with (ii) a
single viewpoint (value judgement) dominated
by a mechanistic perspective of the reality (often
caricatured by LFA); and (iii) circumscribed by
an associated mindset of command and control
(boundary judgement).
The alternative contingency approach proffered
by the authors of the above-mentioned
publications potentially involves another unholy
trinity depicting: (i) situations from the outset as
being (‘factually’) either simple or complicated
(tame), or complex (wicked), and so with
measures of success being ‘fixed’ according to
their initial typological demarcation; with
(ii) multiple viewpoints each aligned (in terms of
‘value’) with a particular tool, method,
methodology or approach; and (iii) associated
with a mindset of deceptively benign holism in
covering all situation ‘types’, and/or benign
pluralism (inclusive of ever increasing tools and
methods).
A more purposeful system might have an
alternative triadic confluence of the six factors:
(a) auditing based on seeing all situations as
comprising a mixture of complicated
(interrelationships), complex (multiple
perspectives), and conflictual (judgements of
boundary); (b) planning based on purposeful
systems design where measures of success are
iterative – flexible and open to change;
(c) evaluating (understanding) where values of
utility are complemented with intrinsic personal
values and political critical values; (d) evaluating
(practice) where values are regarded as not fixed
but developmental involving the evaluator and
other stakeholders in a concerted effort of
developing value in existing practices;
(e) commissioning based on a wider set of
criteria of rigour involving not just reliability and
replicability of tools, but the resonance and
relevance of tools used in an appropriate critical
space of experimentation; and (f) learning based
not just on received wisdom but social learning
involving all stakeholders in a continual cycling
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of single-, double- and triple-loop learning –
inviting not just technical, but ethical as well as
political insight.
There is evidence of shifts towards a more
purposeful evaluation thinking in practice. With
respect to (b) ‘planning’, the draft ODI paper
(Ramalingam et al. 2014) signals the importance
of shifting from ‘fixed’ measures of success to
measures that are open to revision and change –
‘looking for multiple intervention points and
moving between them dynamically… working
through group interaction and iteration rather
than ‘back office’ designs… [and] concentrating
on flexibility rather than predictability of
solutions’ (p.11). A key challenge is how these
principles might be translated into actual
measures to inform a more purposeful
intervention. How might they challenge the
ritualised practice of fixing measures of success
(for intervention managers and evaluators),
irrespective of the inevitable changes occurring
in situations of the evaluand? Similarly, with
respect to (d) ‘evaluating practice’, three other
‘principles’ from the draft ODI paper illustrate well
the type of practice required: ‘… accommodating
multiple alternative perspectives rather than
specific best practices… generating ownership of
problem formulation and transparency through
participation of stakeholders… [and] developing
systematic visual representations of the problem
space that enable group-based exploration of the
solution space’ (ibid.). Also, there is considerable
variation amongst practitioners using the
contingency approach which does not neatly fit the
caricature described above. Many practitioners,
for example, use a wide set of co-guarantor
attributes – item (e) – over and above assurances
of reliable tools. Many also focus on learning –
item (f) – in dealing very much with issues of
power relations associated with impact evaluations.
A significant part of the Mowles (2014) paper is
given to celebrating examples where practitioners
in the evaluation field are able to adapt ideas and
methods using principles of systems thinking and
complexity to their own practice. Amongst
practitioners cited by Mowles in this endeavour
are Allen (1988), Callaghan (2008), Sanderson
(2009), Westhorp (2012) and the more
contemporary works of Stacey (2012). Other
practitioner evaluators whose works are cited by
Mowles in exemplifying the contingency approach
are contributing authors to these two issues of the
IDS Bulletin (e.g. Hummelbrunner, Rogers,
Williams), but their actual practice is much more
creative, versatile and adaptive in the use of
complexity and systems tools than perhaps allowed
for in the main focus of critique. Hummelbrunner
(2010), for example, is also cited by Mowles in the
same paper as a demonstration of how even a
supposedly rigid tool-set such as the Logframe is
able to be cultivated for better practice using, in
his case, ideas from soft systems thinking. One of
the most promising developments of using ideas
of complex adaptive systems without presuming a
contingency approach are ideas of ‘adaptive
action’ (Eoyang and Holladay 2013) based on
earlier innovative use of CAS for organisational
development (Eoyang and Berkas 1998). Adaptive
action resonates significantly with the wider use of
systems ideas in our own approach of systems
thinking in practice.
Table 2 illustrates these more progressive
features in terms of what we might call an
evaluation–adaptive complex, in comparison
with an evaluation–industrial complex.
5 Conclusion
The identification of three core ideas or concepts
associated with systems thinking (cf. Williams
2013 and Williams, this IDS Bulletin) –
interrelationships, perspectives and boundaries –
marks a significant shift in abstracting out
essential features in order to make systems
thinking more resonant with other practices.
The three domains correspond to the three
issues dominating international development in
the last decade (see introduction to IDS Bulletin
45.6, 2014). First, there is a growing concern
regarding impact evaluation from the policy
world; a concern for more evidence-based,
results-orientated or outcomes-orientated
evaluations, raising issues of rigour in evaluation.
Second, there is a concern amongst evaluators
with the complexity of interventions driven by
multiple agencies and multiple perspectives;
concerns that have prompted attention to
participatory and multi-method approaches.
Third, there is a concern amongst commissioners
and evaluators regarding professional
responsibility and independence amongst
evaluators; a concern leading to an associated
need to justify particular approaches.
From a systems thinking in practice perspective,
a more general source of anxiety is that such
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concerns may themselves become systemically
stabilised through ritualised discourse and
practice dominated currently in the evaluation
field by an omnipresent contingency approach.
The approach offers an alternative degree of
rigour towards evaluation, enabling evaluators to
adopt particular tools or tool-sets and ideas for
particular situations. But the approach arguably
has a risk towards stifling the evaluation process
by fetishising methods and tools and distracting
attention away from craft skills amongst
evaluation practitioners and the realpolitik of
any evaluation process.
The systems tool used to make this analysis – the
systemic triangulator – is one based on ideas of
systemic triangulation. As with any tool or model
or system – it is an abstraction from reality, and
as such is neither right nor wrong in terms of
being factually correct. For example, the three
triangular indices of the evaluation–industrial
complex (Figure 2) depicting roles of evaluand
managers, evaluators and commissioners, may in
some contexts actually be embodied in one
person. The value of any model ought rather to
be measured primarily in terms of its usefulness
and adaptability for inquiry in different contexts
by different users.
In particular, practising evaluators may wish to
reflect and develop value on the use of systemic
triangulation for diagnosing possible instances of
systemic failure and the role of evaluation in
such failure. The article provides a tentative
outline model for an evaluation–industrial
complex to help with such a diagnosis. To what
extent might this be helpful in diagnosing
existing evaluation practices, but also to what
extent might it help through adaptation in
cultivating value towards a more purposeful
model of an evaluation–adaptive complex?
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* In addition to the helpful feedback from
reviewers on an earlier draft, particular
appreciation is extended to Barbara Befani,
one of the co-editors of these two special
issues of the IDS Bulletin. Barbara’s insightful
suggestions and prompts have significantly
enriched the final article. The author remains
solely responsible for the final content and
any errors.
1 See www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/
english/bourbonism#examples_box.
2 That is, the primary intervention – project or
programme or policy – of the evaluand (a) and
(b), rather than the secondary intervention of
an evaluation (of the primary intervention)
represented by (c) through to (f).
3 Callaghan (2008) and Sanderson (2000, 2009)
are cited by Mowles (2014: 164) as examples
of more reflective thinking of evaluators’ roles
using systems and complexity thinking.
4 Notwithstanding a chapter given to this
progressive idea of an evaluator, Patton’s book
focuses on evaluators as being able to
accommodate ever more tools and methods
from the tradition of complexity rather than
being adaptive and inventive with their
existing tool-sets.
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